Taxation—Delinquent Taxes—Liens—Validity of Statute—General or Special Legislation by unknown
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 25 Issue 1 
January 1939 
Taxation—Delinquent Taxes—Liens—Validity of Statute—General 
or Special Legislation 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Taxation—Delinquent Taxes—Liens—Validity of Statute—General or Special Legislation, 25 WASH. U. L. Q. 
130 (1939). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol25/iss1/18 
This Comment on Recent Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington 
University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an 
authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
130 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 25
insurer is not liable for a total loss.1l On the other hand, in those states
where there is a valued policy law, a provision of this type is generally
inoperative.1 2
In some instances, instead of insuring the building, the policy insures
the rent or income which the building usually produces. Here a refusal
by the city officials to issue a permit to rebuild, in pursuance of a municipal
ordinance, will not increase the liability of the insurer. The insurer is
liable only for income losses during the time it would have taken to re-
place the building if such an ordinance did not exist.1 3 Thus, there are
two distinct rules of damages. If the building itself is insured, the opera-
tion of the ordinance increases the liability of the insurer unless the policy
contains a provision to the contrary and, as stated, such limitation is effec-
tive only in the absence of a valued policy statute. But if rents are in-
sured, the liability of the insurer is not increased by local legislation.
M. C.
TAXATION-DELINQUENT TAXES-LIENS-VALDITY OP STATUTE-GEN-
ERAL oR SPECIAL LEGISLATIN-[Missuri].-Suit upon an agreed state of
facts1 by a delinquent taxpayer owning real estate in the City of St. Louis,
to enjoin the Collector of Revenue of the city from proceeding by suit,
under the provision of House Bill 677, 60th General Assembly, to enforce
the state's lien for general real estate taxes on delinquent tax bills charged
sec. 8; N. D. Comp. Laws (1913) sees. 6609, 6623; Ohio Gen. Code (1926)
sec. 9583; S. C. Code (1932) secs. 7977, 7980; S. D. Comp. Laws (1929)
sec. 1458; Tenn. Code (1932) sec. 6174; Tex. Vernon's Stats. (1936) 4929;
Wash. Pierce's Code (1933) sec. 3013; W. Va. Code (1931) c. 33, art. 4,
sec. 9; Wis. Stats. (1937) sec. 203.21.
11. Hewins v. London Assurance Corp. (1903) 184 Mass. 177, 68 N. E.
62; McCready v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. (1901) 61 App. Div. 583, 70 N. Y.
S. 778; The Midwood Sanatorium v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co. of San Fran-
cisco (1933) 261 N. Y. 381, 185 N. E. 674.
12. New Orleans Real Estate Mortgage & Securities Co. v. Teutonia Ins.
Co. (1911) 128 La. 45, 54 So. 466; Palatine Ins. Co. v. Nunn (1911) 99
Miss. 493, 55 So. 44; Dinneen v. American Ins. Co. (1915) 98 Neb. 97, 152
N. W. 307, L. R. A. 1915E 618, Ann. Cas. 1917B 1246. Contra: Gouin v.
Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. (1927) 145 Wash. 199, 259 Pac. 387, in which,
however, the court failed to notice the existence or effect of a valued policy
law, Wash. Code (1933) sec. 3013.
13. Amusement Syndicate Co. v. Prussian Natl Ins. Co. (1911) 85 Kan.
367, 116 Pac. 620; First Investment Co. v. Vulcan Underwriters (D. C. D.
Ore. 1927) 33 F. (2d) 785. But see Palatine Ins. Co. v. O'Brien (1908) 107
Md. 341, 68 Atl. 484, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1055.
1. The more important facts are: (1) Percentage of sales in St. Louis
and St. Louis County are two per cent and eight per cent, respectively,
whereas average percentage for other counties is thirty-eight per cent.
(2) City of St. Louis invested $199,454.02 at sales held under Jones-Munger
Law in 1936, 1937 and 1938, for the purchase of property being offered a
third time to protect liens for state, city and school taxes against said
property. (3) General real estate markets in St. Louis and St. Louis County
vary to a great extent from those in other counties of the state. (4) There
is a greater demand for insuring titles to real estate in St. Louis and
St. Louis County than in most other counties of the state.
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against property for the years 1934 through 1938 inclusive. Held, injunc-
tion denied. The repeal of certain sections of prior act and enactment
of substitute sections classifying delinquent taxpayers on the basis of
density of population of the area in which their property is situated held
valid. The latter is not an arbitrary basis.2
In 1933 the 57th General Assembly adopted the Jones-Munger Act 3 in
the belief that a summary sale of land subject to delinquent taxes would
afford an effective check to the rapidly increasing amount of delinquent
taxes. 4 The act provided that the collector of revenue was authorized to
offer for sale lands without first reducing the delinquent tax to judgment.5
If the amount did not equal the delinquent taxes with penalty, interest and
costs, a second offering ws required the following year.6 If this offer failed
to realize the sum above required, a third offering the ensuing year was
authorized at which sale the land was sold to the highest bidder.7
As adopted, the Jones-Munger Act was a failure.8 Owing to the small
amounts offered at the authorized sales, the cities of St. Louis and Kansas
City were obliged to protect their interest by bidding in numerous proper-
ties.9 The result was a demand for repeal of the act at least so far as
metropolitan areas were concerned. 10 House Bill 677 embodies the desired
changes by authorizing collection of delinquent taxes by suit in the metro-
politan areas leaving the provisions authorizing summary procedure by the
collector applicable to the rural areas."
The plaintiff in the instant action contended: (1) that the House Bill
violated section 28, art. IV of the Missouri Constitution, in that it contained
more than one subject as clearly expressed in its title; and (2) that the
act constituted local and special legislation in so far as classification and
diversity of remedy based on different population densities was arbitrary
and not applicable to all persons and places concerned.
The court decided upon plaintiff's first contention that the title was
2. Hull v. Bauman (Mo. 1939) 131 S. IV. (2d) 721.
3. Laws of Missouri, 1933, 425.
4. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, April 27, 1939, p. 10A.
5. Laws of Missouri, 1933, 432, sec. 9953.
6. Ibid., 432.
7. Ibid., 432, sec. 9953a.
8. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, February 16, 1939, p. 6B; St. Louis Globe
Democrat, April 27, 1939, p. 9A.
9. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, February 16, 1939, p. 6B: Members of the
House Ways and Means Committee were informed that unpaid back taxes;
as of February, 1939, totaled more than $12,000,000 in St. Louis and about
$7,000,000 in Kansas City. Also, St. Louis Star-Times, February 16, 1939,
p. 28.
10. As early as 1937 repeal bills were introduced into the 59th General
Assembly and passed by both houses, but the bills were vetoed by Governor
Lloyd C. Stark. Journal of the House, 59th General Assembly of the State
of Missouri, 1937, 1342-1346. St. Louis Globe-Democrat, March 15, 1939,
p. 3A; St. Louis Post-Dispatch, April 20, 1939, p. 11C; St. Louis Globe
Democrat, June 3, 939, p. 2A. An amendment strengthening the applica-
tion of the act in rural areas was also adopted. Laws of Missouri, 1939,
850-853.
11. Laws of Missouri, 1939, 878.
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general, dealing with "delinquent taxes," that it was an amendment to the
Jones-Munger Act, and that each section of House Bill 677 dealt exclusively
with the subject-matter of that act. This was sufficient.12
Upon plaintiff's second contention, the court ruled that House Bill 677
dealing with St. Louis and St. Louis County13 was to be read with House
Bill 555 dealing with Kansas City and Jackson County.14 In arriving at
this conclusion, the court depended not upon the area or class now affected
by its operation, but rather upon whether: (A) the classification was left
open and permitted other poltical subdivisions to come within its purview
if and when they should qualify;'5 and (B) whether the classification was
based upon a "similarity of situation or condition with respect to the
feature which renders the law appropriate and applicable."'1 With respect
to A the principle is well established that laws having reference to cities
or counties of specified population are general.17 With regard to B the
court justifies the reasonableness of the classification' 8 by the pitiful failure
in St. Louis and St. Louis County of the operation of the Jones-Munger
Law.19
12. It will be noted that the title to the Jones-Munger Law (Laws of
Missouri, 1933, 425), amended by the present act, states that it is a bill
to repeal certain sections of art. IX, c. 59, of R. S. Mo., 1929, entitled
"Taxation & Revenue," and relating to "Delinquent & Back Taxes"; that
the amendatory act (House Bill 677) states that said bill is one "relating to
the same subject matter." It is perfectly apparent that the "subject matter"
referred to is that of "Delinquent and Back Taxes," with which the new
act deals. The general purpose of the law, therefore, deals with the subject
matter expressed and unless the particulars stated in the title of the original
law are restrictive of the general purpose, the title of the amendatory law
need not state its own particulars. See: Graves v. Purcell (1935) 337 Mo.
574, 85 S. W. 543. In State ex rel. Van Brown v. Shepard (1881) 74 Mo. 310
it was held that where the title to an act set forth that the act provided
for the collection of delinquent state taxes, it was broad enough to cover
provision relating to the collection of city taxes by the state. Accord:
Ward v. Board of Equalization (1896) 135 Mo. 309, 36 S. W. 648; Becker
v. Wellston Sewer District (1933) 332 Mo. 547, 87 S. W. (2d) 147; State
ex inf. Crain v. Moore (1936) 339 Mo. 492, 99 S. W. (2d) 17.
13. Laws of Missouri, 1939, 878.
14. Laws of Missouri, 1939, 873. Instant decision, by inference, upholds
this bill. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, September 21, 1939, p. 3A.
15. In State ex rel. Zoological Board v. City of St. Louis (1928) 318 Mo.
910, 1 S. W. (2d) 1021 it was stated: "This court has frequently held that
laws having reference to cities of a specified population are general in
their nature. Citations to verify this holding seem superfluous, or as those
given to similes put it, are like 'carrying coals to Newcastle.'" Accord:
Vrooman v. City of St. Louis (1935) 337 Mo. 933, 88 S. W. (2d) 189;
State ex rel. Crain v. Moore (1936) 339 Mo. 492, 99 S. W. (2d) 17.
16 State ex inf. Barrett v. Hedrick (1922) 294 Mo. 21, 241 S. W. 402;
supra, note 2.
17. Supra, note 15.
18. In State ex inf. Barrett v. Hedrick (1922) 294 Mo. 21, 74, 241 S. W.
402 the court said: "The basis of sound legislative classification is similarity
of situation or condition with respect to the feature which renders the law
appropriate and applicable." To same effect, see: State ex rel. Holloway v.
Knight (1929) 323 Mo. 1241, 21 S. W. (2d) 767.
19. Supra, note 2; St. Louis Post-Dispatch, February 16, 1939, p. 6B;
St. Louis Globe-Democrat, April 27, 1939, p. 9A.
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It is pertinent to inquire whether the conclusion arrived at by the Mis-
souri Supreme Court is based upon sound principles of constitutional law.
The court is sustained upon the question of notice from the statute's title
by numerous Missouri decisions.20 More doubtful is the decision validating
the classification of all delinquent taxpayers on the basis of densities of
population. The courts in Alabama,2 1 Georgia,22 Oklahoma,23 Nevada,24
South Carolina,25 Tennessee26 and Wisconsin,27 have condemned such delin-
quent tax laws as special and local legislation.
The Supreme Court of Missouri has adopted a pragmatic approach to
the solution of the delinquent tax problem based on factual results under
the sales held in conformity with the original act. If the agreed statement
of facts is true, the original act failed of its purpose in the metropolitan
areas, leaving taxes unpaid and creating no vendible tax title in the pur-
chaser. Whether the repeal of the act will achieve the end desired, only
practical application can tell. As for the decision, it appears open to serious
question both upon orthodox principle of statutory construction and because
of its probable consequences. S. R. S.
TORTS-DEFAMATION By RADIO-LIABILITY OF BROADCASTING COMPANY-
[Federal].-A radio broadcasting company leased its facilities to an adver-
tising corporation for programs featuring a widely known entertainer as
the principal performer. The actor, while conducting an interview one
night, suddenly departed from the prepared and approved script and inter-
polated a defamatory extemporaneous remark concerning the plaintiff hotel.
Defendant company had no opportunity to prevent the interjection. Plain-
tiff hotel brought action in trespass against the broadcasting company for
defamation to recover damages for injury to plaintiff company's reputa-
tion and business. Held, a broadcasting company that leases its time and
facilities to another, whose agents carry on the program, is not liable for
an interjected defamatory remark where it appears that it had exercised
due care in selection of the lessee, and had edited the script.'
In general, the rule of absolute liability applies to the publication of
defamatory material.2 The publisher acts at his peril.3 This rule has
20. Supra, note 12.
21. Bridges v. McWilliams (1934) 228 Ala. 47, 152 So. 457.
22. Atlantic & F. R. Co. v. Wright (1891) 87 Ga. 487, 13 S. E. 578.
23. Board of Commissioners v. Hammerly (1922) 85 Okla. 53, 204 Pac.
445.
24. State of Nevada v. Consolidated Virginia Mining Co. (1882) 16 Nev.
432.
25. Webster v. Williams (1937) 183 S. C. 368, 191 S. E. 51.
26. State v. Collier (1932) 165 Tenn. 28, 52 S. W. (2d) 361.
27. Pedro v. Grootemaat (1921) 174 Wis. 412, 183 N. W. 153.
1. Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co. (Pa. 1939) 8 A. (2d)
302.
2. Peck v. Tribune Co. (1909) 214 U. S. 185; Thorley v. Lord Kerry(1812) 4 Taunt. 355; Keller, Federal Control of Defamation by Radio
(1936) 12 Notre Dame Lawyer 134, 162.
3. Peck v. Tribune Co. (1909) 214 U. S. 185.
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